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  1How Inside Money Makes Inflation Costly For Most 






It is argued that inflation creates private incentives for (socially costly) inside money 
to supplant (socially costless) outside money. Consequently, the familiar ‘shoe leather 
cost’ of inflation, that operates through a reduced demand for money under inflation, 
is supplemented  by a separate social cost of inflation that operates through an 
increased  supply of (inside) money under inflation. It is further argued that allowance 
of the costliness of an inflation-induced expansion of inside money changes the 
character of the distribution of the costs of inflation. Certain suppliers of inside money 
may experience a net gain from an inflation. The upshot is that inflation is no longer  
necessarily a ‘common enemy’, but may be welcomed by some economic interests. 
 
 
  2Theories of why inflation is costly are plentiful (see Dowd 1994 for a survey). This 
paper advances an additional explanation as to why inflation is costly. This paper 
finds an ‘inflation cost culprit’ in the apparently useful phenomenon of inside money. 
This paper argues that inflation creates private incentives for socially costly inside 
money to supplant socially costless outside money.  
 
The paper’s argument turns critically on a certain theory of the supply of inside 
money. This theory is squarely based on optimisation, is impelled by Hicksian themes 
of the competition between inside and outside money, and sets out from the question, 
‘As outside money has a (private) opportunity cost that a mere promise to pay outside 
money does not, why is outside money used at all?’.
1  
 
The paper’s theory of inside money (see Coleman 2007 for a full treatment) identifies 
the nominal rate of return on physical capital, ι, as the key determinant of the supply 
of inside money, and implies that the supply of inside money is a positively function 
of the nominal rate of return on capital.  
 
The paper’s theory of the supply of inside has important implications for the analysis 
of the costliness of inflation. Since inflation increases the nominal rate of return on 
capital, ι,  the theory implies that inflation will increase the issue of inside money. 
And that increase in inside money will substitute for a certain amount of outside 
money. But that substitution amounts to the substitution of a socially costless form of 
money – outside money- by (it will be argued) a socially costly form of money – 
                                                 
1 See Hicks on the competition between inside and outside money (Hicks 1939, 1989). 
  3inside money. Inflation has therefore has a social cost on account of the supply 
response of inside money. 
 
Further, the paper’s theory of the supply of inside has important implications for the 
analysis of the distribution of the costs of inflation. For while the theory asserts that 
inflation induces a supply response in inside money that is socially costly, the theory   
allows that some persons may experience a net gain from an inflation-induced 
expansion of inside money. These are persons whose costs of supplying inside money 
are so favourable that they supply a disproportionate amount of the total increase in 
inside money, and that permits them to acquire capital by the issue of inside money,  
at a net gain to themselves.  Because of this possibility - because some suppliers of 
inside money may experience a net gain from an inflation-induced expansion of inside 
money -  inflation is no longer necessarily a common enemy but may be welcomed by 
part of the community. 
 
1. A model of the supply of inside money. 
 
As has been underlined, the thesis of this paper rests on a particular theory of the supply 




The model assumes that holding money provides a benefit that is represented by the 
appearance of real money holdings in the utility function.       
 
  4         (1)  11 ( , ,... ; , ,... ) T Uu C CC h hh = T
   C  =  consumption   
      h = holdings of real money balances 
      T = final period; the current period is indexed as zero 
 
The model assumes that money holdings, h, can consist of either outside money or 
inside money.  Outside money is state money; ‘fiduciary’ notes and coin. Inside money 
is a (credible) promise to pay outside money. More precisely, inside money is a 
credible promise to pay outside money to the bearer of the promise, on the demand of 
the bearer, and at no cost to the bearer.
2 These promises will circulate within that 
network of people who have been persuaded of these promises credibility.  
 
As inside money is a credible promise to pay the bearer outside money, the benefit of 
an extra unit of inside money is the same as the benefit of an extra unit of outside 
money, Uh. Given this perfect substitutability of inside and outside money, there is 
from the point of view of the money holder, just ‘money’, and the money holder will 
hold money until the marginal utility of money relative to the marginal utility of 
consumption – i.e. the implicit yield on money - equals the nominal rate of return on 
capital. 
 





ι =       ( 2 )  
                                                 
2 Economic historians have extensively documented cases where the population at 
large have used as a medium of exchange such promises to pay. See Shann (1938 pp. 
52-3), and O’Connell and Reid (2005). 
  5 
     = h U marginal utility of real balances 
     = C U marginal utility of consumption 
    ι =nominal rate of return on physical capital
3
 
The principal cost of the supply of inside money is assumed to comprise the cost of 
making any promise to pay a credible promise There are costs in making a promise a 
credible, namely the costs of providing evidence of the solvency and the honesty of 
the issuer of the promise. Evidence of solvency includes audited accounts, and 
perhaps investment in ‘conspicuous capital’ (eg ostentatious buildings). Evidence of 
honesty might include demonstrations of the willingness of persons of known honesty 
to associate with, and speak for, the issuer of the promise. These evidences are costly, 
and we will call these costs ‘credibility costs’. 
4
 
We suppose that there are two reasons one has to spend more on credibility to 
increase one’s issue of inside money; 
  
                                                 
3 It proves convenient to measure the nominal rate of return on capital as the 
increment in nominal value, between period zero and period one, expressed as a 
proportion of the nominal value in period one (rather than in period zero) Thus  
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4 There is another cost of the supply of inside money. This cost turns on our 
assumption that the promise to pay money is a promise to pay money at no cost to the 
bearer, where ‘cost’ includes inconvenience and time loss to the bearer in being paid. 
The provision of honouring a promise in a way that is both convenient and timely to 
the bearer also involves cost to the issuer. We might call these ‘convenience costs’. 
There is, thirdly, the matter of ‘operational costs’. It will cost money to produce the 
physical embodiment of promises in a way that is not worth the while of a forger 
successfully forging them. 
  61.  ‘Credibility Deepening’. As the magnitude of these liabilities rise there must 
be more scrutiny to establish whether the issuer can and will meet these 




2.  ‘Credibility Widening’. If the issue is to expand, the network amongst which 
these promises are accepted must expand. More persons must be persuaded 
that the issuer is solvent and faithful to his promises.  
 
The increasing costs of issuing premises can be represented by letting Z be the total 
costs of issuing n of inside money. 
  
     () Z Zn =          ( 3 )     '0 Z >
     
6 issue of inside money in real terms n ≡
 
The marginal cost of issue will prove to be a significant variable, and we symbolise it 
ζ. 
 








     (4) 
ζ (n) = Z’(n) is the cost of establishing the credibility of the nth dollar promised. 
 
                                                 
5 The magnitude of n is assumed to be known or knowable. 
6 N is the nominal issue. Z is related to the real circulation of notes, N/P ≡ n, not N. 
The same nominal issue may be truly considered either very extensive or very slight, 
depending on whether P is large or small. 





. That is, the marginal cost of establishing credit worthiness is 
increasing in n (‘increasing marginal costs’), at least for ‘low’ and ‘high’ magnitudes 
of n. This assumption is required for the existence of a maximum in the households’ 
inside money issue problem. 
 
 






We will make one final assumption about the ‘technology’ of issuing inside money. 
It concerns how long the credibility of a promise to pay  outside money lasts. Once a 
promise has been made credible, for how long will it be credible? Forever? For the 
current period? A finite number of periods? We make the extreme assumption that 
credibility lasts only ‘one period’. Promises made this period are credible for 
redemption at the opening of the following period, but are otherwise have zero 





The individual issues an amount of inside money that is utility maximising. 
 
The individual’s maximisation problem is,  
 
Choose    11 , ,... ; , ,... TT CC C hh h




Period 0:    11 () PC H K P PZ n Pw P K PK M N ρ− ++ + = + + ++ 
 
Period 1:    1 1 11 211 1 1111 1 1 () PC H PK PZ n Pw P K PK H N N ρ ++ + = + + + +−
       
     e t c       ( 5 )  
           
    M = endowment of outside money at opening of period zero 
    K = endowment of physical capital 
  w  =  real  wage 
  ρ = rate of profit 
    H = holdings of nominal money balances 
  9   
 
The period budget constraints can be consolidated into a single budget constraint, 
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   π = rate of inflation 
   m  =  endowment  of  outside money in real terms 
 
Optimisation with respect to n implies, 
 








≡    (7) 
 
The equality says that inside money is issued until the marginal credibility cost, ζ, 
equals the nominal rate of return on capital, ι.  
 
This key result can be rationalised an ‘Argument from Increasing Capital Holdings’.  
Suppose that promises to pay are used by the issuer to purchase capital. Suppose also 
the capital thus acquired is sold next period in order to meet the redemption of the 
  10promise to pay. This is a ‘feasible’ variation in the lifetime ‘plans’ of the decision 
maker. What is the net payoff to this variation? The addition to costs is, clearly, ζ. 
What is the benefit? There is no benefit from increased money holdings, since (by 
assumption) there is no increase in money holdings. But there is a benefit from the 
capital that has been acquired. This lies in the income of capital so acquired, which is 
 ι per dollar. So, matching the cost of issuing money with benefit yields, 
 
  ζ = ι         ( 8) 
 




The upshot of the equimarginal condition is that Figure 1’s plotting of the marginal 
cost of money issue, ζ, against the quantity of inside money, nm may now  be re-
                                                 
7 A more formal demonstration of ‘The Argument From Capital Holding’ goes this 
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This expression allows for the  purchased capital to provide one period of profit, 
1 C U ρ , as well as for consumption gain from the depreciation of the nominal debt 









. If the 
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  11interpreted as a plotting of the nominal rate of return on capital, against the quantity of 
inside money. 
 







2. How inside money makes inflation socially costly. 
 
The model of inside money advanced in section 1 has an implication of considerable 
significance: there is an aspect of ‘printing money’ in issuing inside money. There is a 
net income to be derived from doing it. The issuer gains a capital asset, and receives it 
income, less the costs of establishing credibility. Plainly, allowing people to build 
their own printing presses, and spend the outside money they print, is socially 
wasteful. And similarly there is waste in persons issuing inside money: resources are 
  12devoted to establishing credibility for the purpose of avoiding the opportunity cost of 
outside money. But the opportunity cost of outside money is purely a private cost, and 
involves no social cost.
 Thus the reduction in the holding of outside money, that the 
issue of inside money permits, produces no reduction in social costs. But it does 
involve costs. Inside money is socially wasteful. 
 
This contention can be underlined by an examination of Figure 3. Figure 3 plots the 
supply schedule of inside money. 
 
Figure 3: The social cost and private benefit of the issue of inside money 
ι 
supply curve of inside 




Let nominal rate of return on capital, ι, equal aa.  Then the supply of inside money is 
ee.  The total variable costs of supplying ee of inside money is cc bb ee dd, given that 
supply curve is interpretable as the marginal cost curve. The gross benefit to suppliers 
is aa bb ee dd; this equals ιn, the income from the capital that can be thought  to have 





  13the excess of ιn over the costs of issuing n. But the critical point is that there is no 
social benefit in the supply of ee. For if the suppliers, contrary to their private interest, 
had supplied zero inside money, where would be the social loss? Or – to vary the 
thought – if inside money was banned, where would be the social loss? For the given 
nominal rate on return on capital, the same amount of real money would be held, h. 
The sole difference is that the whole of real money demand, h, would now held in the 
form of outside money – and  the cost of the supply of inside money is therefore 
saved.  
 
The creation of a social cost by inside money can be elaborated to yield a 
igure 4 illustrates the costliness of an inflation-induced issue of inside money.  
tal 
   
comparative-static result about the size of that cost and the size of inflation. Since the 
nominal rate of return on capital rises with the inflation rate, we can easily see that 
inflation induces an unnecessary and costly expansion of inside money. Inflation 




Figure 4 plots two schedules: the supply of inside money, n; and the demand for 
money, h. The magnitude of real outside money, M/P,  can be read as the  horizon
distance between these two schedules since equality  of money demand with money 
supply requires that  real outside money, M/P, equal the excess of h over n. 
 
  ) ( ) ( ι ι n h
P
M
− =  
 
  14Let  gg bb be the rate of return on capital when inflation is zero. Then gg aa is  the 
rate of return on capital when inflation is aa bb. Then the ‘credibility cost’ of inflation 
increasing from zero to aa bb equals cc dd ee ff , and this is a social cost.  
 
Figure 4: The social cost of inflation’s  expansion of inside money 
ι  the demand 
for money 
the supply of 
inside money 
aa dd
cc  outside money 
bb
gg 
ff ee  h,n 
 
 
How large is the increase in ‘credibility costs’ that results from increased inflation ? 
Let Γ symbolise the total cost (in consumption equivalent) of the ‘credibility costs’ of 
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  15Given our assumption that credibility of  inside money issue lasts only one period, we 






























Evidently, the magnitude of the increment in ‘credibility costs’ from extra inflation is 
governed, first, by  the size of inside money, n, and second by the elasticity of the 
supply of inside money to the nominal rate of return on capital. 
 
3. How inside money can create an “inflation 
constituency”. 
 
There is a paradoxical aspect about the analysis of section 2. It was argued that 
inflation is socially costly, on account of the costly expansion of inside money it 
  16induces; a social cost represented in Figure 4 by ee ff cc dd.  Yet, if all persons faced 
the same marginal costs of inside money, every person would expect to gain from 
inflation; they would expect to gain an equal share of the net benefit cc bb aa dd. 
 
How can each person measure a benefit to themselves from the impact of inflation if 
there is a social loss arising from the impact of inflation? 
 
To explore this puzzle, recall that in the judgement of each issuer, issuing inside 
money has allowed them to earn an income earning asset (capital) with something 
else (inside money) that has no costs, apart from credibility costs. In other words, 
each issuer believes that by issuing inside money they acquire more capital. But it is 
impossible for each and every person to acquire more capital by issuing inside money: 
the capital stock is a given. Or, to be more precise, assuming everyone has the same 
supply function of inside money, no one will own any more capital under inflation 
than they would if no one issued inside money. The only thing the issue of inside 
money does in this circumstance is to raise the current price level more than it would 
have.  For as monetary equilibrium requires, 
     ) ( ) ( ι ι n h
P
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we can infer, 
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and so, 




















Clearly, the response of the current price level to an increase in the rate of inflation is 







  term. The upshot is  that the inside money 
issued goes, not into buying capital, but in restoring depleted holdings of real money 
balances
8. If, for some reason, no one issued inside money save for one person, that 
single person would benefit from the issue of inside money in times of inflation, and 
by means of the purchase of capital that their issue would finance. However, if 
everyone issues inside money, no one will own more capital than they would have in 
the absence of issues, and all will have merely wasted some resources in establishing 
credibility for the expanded issue. We have a ‘paradox of action’; a ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’: everybody privately benefits from expanding their issue of inside money in 
times of inflation, but everyone   suffers from everybody expanding their issue of 
inside money in times of inflation. Everybody would be better off if there was no 
inflation. 
 
The proposition of the preceding paragraphs that everybody would be better off  under 
zero inflation is dependent on our assumption that everyone has the same supply 
function of inside money. If costs functions are heterogeneous the benefits and costs 
of inflation-induced inside money issue are heterogeneous. To illustrate, suppose the 
population falls into two groups. One group faces prohibitively high credibility costs, 
and consequently issues zero inside money at all rates of inflation. The second group 
                                                 
8 The issuer has managed to maintain real balances without selling their capital. That is ‘where’ their 
issues have gone: not in increasing their capital, but in not having to sell it. 
  18faces manageable credibility costs, and consequently issues some inside money at all 
rates of inflation. Clearly, an expansion of inflation in this model results in what 
amounts to a transfer of capital from the High Cost group to the Low Cost group. It 
appears as if the Low Cost group has imposed an inflation tax on the High Cost 
group, and that the High Cost group has paid for it by selling their capital to the Low 
Cost group.  And the appearance is not illusory.  We have already observed that the 
responsiveness of inside money to inflation raises the current period price level. This 
extra jump in P amounts to a tax on the real value of outside money. Everyone who 
holds outside money ‘pays’ the tax, but - under our present assumptions - not all 
receive the ‘tax proceeds’.  Only the Low Cost group issue inside money, so only they 
receive the ‘tax proceeds’. If the High Cost group is large enough in its money 
holdings compared to the  Low Cost group, then the tax proceeds will exceed the Low 
Costs groups own ‘tax  burden’ plus the Low Cost group’s increased credibility costs 
– and the Low Cost group shall have experienced a net benefit from inflation. 
 
4.  Can inside money really be that bad? 
 
The theory advanced in sections 1 to 3 has a credibility issue of its own. Can inside 
money really be a bane? Could it really be desirable to ban it?   
 
The answer to these questions is not controversial. Inside money is not really a bane. 
It is a bane in the model. But it is not a bane in the real world. It is a bane in the model 
because the model has allowed for the costliness of inside money, but ignored its 
  19(social) benefits it supplies in the real world. Recall Jevons’ 1875 enumeration of the 
desirable properties of money: 
 
1.  Value 
2.  Portability 
3.  Indestructibility 
4.  Homogeneity 
5.  Divisibility 
6.  Stability  of value 
7.  Cognizability 
 
Clearly inside money has manifest advantages over outside money in the matter of 
Portability. It also has advantages relative to outside money regarding Divisibility and 
Indestructibility.  In matters of Value, and Stability of Value, inside money has no 
disadvantage relative to outside money. It is only in Homogeneity and Cognizability 
that inside money is (usually) inferior to outside money, and the present analysis has 
given its exclusive attention to that inferiority, to the complete neglect of inside 
money’s various advantages. 
 
Therefore the implicit recommendation of the present analysis – that inside money be 
banned – would not survive allowance for the various advantages of inside money. 
Nevertheless, the conclusion that the issue of inside money is (welfare) inefficiently 
large would survive. Further, since inflation will not add to inside money’s 
advantages of Portability etc  - but will (according to the model)  increase the issue of 
  20inside money - the “excess issue” of inside money (from a welfare criterion) would 
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